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FOREWORD
The stability of the Gulf remains a priority of U.S.
national security interests. Because of its importance
both politically and economically, the region is and
should likely remain a critical area for U.S. Armed
Forces in the near future. But if for a long time, the Gulf
Arab kingdoms seemed to be passive actors of their
own region―leaving either Iran, Iraq, or Western
powers to shape the power plays―they now reached
an unprecedented level of strategic ambition. As
evidenced by their active diplomatic agendas in the
Middle East and their increased military involvement
in regional crises, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are now players that matter.
Does this mean that the GCC could become a credible regional organization enforcing collective security
in the Peninsula? For years, this has been a dream that
even the most optimistic planners of the U.S. Department of Defense considered distant, if not farfetched.
The recent new crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar
reminds us that diplomatic cooperation remains fragile in the region.
But recognizing the constraints of contemporary
political disputes should not prevent us from discussing the idea of collective security in the Gulf. It is in
this spirit, that in his new monograph, Dr. Jean-Loup
Samaan looks at the operational issues behind the concept of the GCC as a security organization. Too often
overlooked by the scholarship, topics like the building
of a joint command, the development of a common
military culture, or the reinforcement of maritime coordination, require a serious discussion among practitioners. In this context, based on in-depth research and
interviews conducted in the region, this monograph
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provides us with an up-to-date evaluation of the feasibility of this project which will be beneficial not only
for scholars, but also for the U.S. defense community.
For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to offer this monograph on the challenges of
collective security in the Gulf and the manner in which
this major issue can impact U.S. national security
interests.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Since the Arab revolutions started in early 2011,
the Gulf countries have raised the level of their strategic ambitions. In various cases, countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) flexed their diplomatic
muscles―Qatar and Saudi Arabia being at the forefront
on the Syrian file―and demonstrated military resolve―
via the interventions in Bahrain (2011), Libya (2011),
and Yemen (2015). With traditional Arab powers like
Egypt coping with post-revolution internal troubles,
Gulf kingdoms seemed now to be the major players in
the arena of the Arab League. This shift in Arab geopolitics led observers to refer to this era as the so-called
Gulf moment.
As a result, the new assertiveness from Gulf countries in the international arena stirred a discussion
on the prospects for stronger military cooperation at
the level of the GCC itself. For a long time, collective
defense was a distant prospect in the Peninsula. The
modest size of local armed forces, the traditional reliance on the three major Western powers (the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France) and occasional disagreements among Gulf countries concerning their strategic priorities all concurred to postpone
progress in the field of joint military cooperation.
Additionally, the 2017 political crisis between
Qatar and three of the GCC members (Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) obviously
reminds us the need for a cautious evaluation of the
prospects of collective security in the Gulf. But rather
than detailing the numerous caveats that still exist concerning the Gulf regional security system, this monograph puts the alliance politics aside and looks at the
security environment and the operational requirements for the GCC. In other words, it aims to discuss
xi

the practical steps required to turn the Council into
an effective collective defense organization. By no
means does this approach dismiss the politics behind
the making of the GCC. Only the resolution of local
disputes can bring about the needed momentum for
regional cooperation, but the political dimension too
frequently prevents observers to discuss the concrete
feasibility of the project.
Against that backdrop, the monograph starts by
looking at the GCC as a regional organization. It details
its origins, underlines the role played by the security
environment in shaping the GCC agenda, and assesses
its main achievements so far in the military field. The
second part provides a detailed account of the contemporary security challenges that call for enhanced
military cooperation: the increasing demands for GCC
expeditionary capabilities in light of regional crisis
such as Yemen; the maritime security in the Gulf in
the context of Iranian assertiveness on the sea; and the
ballistic arms race led by the same Iran. Following this
appraisal of the contemporary security environment,
the document looks at some of the most significant
projects within the GCC to enhance its military cooperation: the building of a joint command; the emphasis
on joint naval activities; and the making of a regional
missile defense coordination structure. It also identifies some of the long-term needs for the national armed
forces to fulfill these objectives: the need to strengthen
education and training programs in the Peninsula and
to foster a multilateral culture among Gulf militaries.
Finally, it reflects on the relations with Western allies
in that perspective. In particular, it explains how initiatives such as the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Forum and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Istanbul Cooperation Initiative could prove instrumental to
support GCC’s collective defense project.
xii

TOWARD A NATO OF THE GULF?
THE CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
WITHIN THE GCC
INTRODUCTION
Since the Arab revolutions started in early 2011,
the Gulf countries have raised the level of their strategic ambitions. In various cases, countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) flexed their diplomatic
muscles, Qatar and Saudi Arabia being at the forefront
on the Syrian file, and demonstrated military resolve
via interventions in Bahrain (2011), Libya (2011), and
Yemen (2015). With traditional Arab powers like Egypt
coping with post-revolution internal troubles, Gulf
kingdoms seemed now to be the major players in the
arena of the Arab League. This shift in Arab geopolitics
led observers to refer to this era as the so-called Gulf
moment. In a recent monograph from the U.S. Army
War College, Dr. Florence Gaub from the European
Institute for Security Studies argued that:
the implosion of some, previously strong, regional actors
(such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) has given way to other
players—all of which are now located in the Gulf. In
terms of regional relations, the Arab world has therefore
entered a Gulf moment, and is likely to remain in it for
the time being.1

The expression “Gulf moment” was first coined by
the Emirati scholar Abdulkhaleq Abdulla before the
upheavals of 2011. In a research paper written for the
London School of Economics, Abdulla stated:
This is the Arab Gulf moment in contemporary Arab
history. The six mostly small but oil-rich states of Kuwait,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the United
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Arab Emirates (the Arab Gulf states or AGS) are taking
the lead, influencing events, assuming greater financial
responsibilities, projecting socioeconomic confidence,
and becoming increasingly conscious of their newly
acquired status as a regional power that far transcends
the rest of the Arab countries.2

The statement, coming from an eminent Gulf
scholar, revealed the new confident mind-set in the
Peninsula. In several other publications after the revolutions occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, Abdulla
reiterated his message.3 However, what the Emirati
researcher did not anticipate with his concept was if
and how this moment would progressively lead to a
more cohesive security structure at the regional level.
As a matter of fact, the new assertiveness from Gulf
countries in the international arena stirred a discussion
on the prospects for stronger military cooperation at
the level of the GCC itself.
For many years, collective defense was a distant
prospect in the Peninsula. The modest size of local
armed forces, the traditional reliance on the three
major Western powers (the United States, the United
Kingdom [UK], and France) and occasional disagreements among Gulf countries concerning their strategic priorities all concurred to postpone progress in the
field of joint military cooperation.
For the last 3 decades, each year GCC summits
would commit the stakeholders to the building of a
stronger regional defense organization, but it usually
remained in the background, as economic initiatives
were deemed more effective and less politically sensitive. The difficulties experienced by the GCC were
nothing exceptional, as they are a reminder of the long
struggle within the European Union to build a strong
military component.
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Our research question finds its origins in the latest
developments in Gulf security and the way these events
could lead the GCC to become a new actor of collective
defense. In December 2012, the 35th GCC summit in
Doha, Qatar, evidenced this trend with the announced
creation of a joint naval force and a common counterterrorist organization. This followed earlier rumors
that a joint Gulf command also would be established.
Furthermore, amid the latest Saudi-led operation in
Yemen against Houthi rebels in March 2015, the idea of
an “Arab North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”
resurfaced in policy circles. Approximately at the same
time, Arab League Secretary General Nabil Al Arabi
called for a unified multinational Arab fighting force,
unearthing the distant memories of the defunct Arab
Deterrent Force that was deployed in Lebanon in 1976.4
Today, the idea of a multinational Arab force mostly
gained traction in the Gulf, a region that remains to
this day the most integrated one within the Arab
World (compared to the quasi-absence of cooperation
in the Maghreb and the Middle East).5 However, the
road toward an Arab, or to be more accurate, a Gulf,
NATO is full of political and operational uncertainties.
The 2017 political crisis between Qatar and three of
the GCC members (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) obviously reminds us of the need
for a cautious evaluation of the prospects of collective
security in the Gulf. Rather than detailing the numerous caveats that still exist concerning the Gulf regional
security system, this monograph puts the alliance politics aside and looks at the security environment and
the operational requirements for the GCC. In other
words, it aims to discuss the practical steps required
to turn the Council into an effective collective defense
organization. By no means does this approach dismiss

3

the politics behind the making of the GCC―only the
resolution of local disputes can bring about the needed
momentum for regional cooperation―but the political
dimension too frequently prevents observers to discuss the concrete feasibility of the project.
Our reference to measure the achievements in the
Gulf will be NATO, as the organization remains today
the most integrated military structure for regional security. NATO is by no means a perfect organization, it
experiences many shortcomings such as regular strategic disagreements among its 28 members; a command
structure still heavily based on a Cold War model; and
an imbalance between American and European capabilities. Nevertheless, these limitations are also the
very reason why the NATO analogy is worth testing.
Because the Atlantic Alliance is not an ideal institution,
it provides a realistic assessment on the making of a
collective defense system.
Moreover, the purpose of this monograph is not to
recommend a mere transposition of a NATO model
into the Gulf context. Not only would this idea deny
fundamental cultural differences, but also there are
many objective parameters that limit the values of the
analogy. These include the number of country members and the size of the territories covered by the organization; the nature of threats and challenges facing
the actors; the general political sensitivity among
neighbors regarding regional cooperation; and, finally,
the level of readiness of national armed forces. Despite
these forewarnings, some aspects of NATO structure
can be worth exploring for the GCC: the making of its
joint command, its training and education programs,
and overall the Alliance’s experience in building a
strong multilateral culture among its members’ armed
forces.
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Based on these elements, this monograph is divided
into four main sections. The first section starts by looking at the GCC as a regional organization. We retrace
its origins, underline the role played by the security
environment in shaping the GCC agenda, and describe
its main achievements so far in the military field. The
second section provides a detailed account of the contemporary security challenges that call for enhanced
military cooperation: the increasing demands for GCC
expeditionary capabilities in light of regional crisis
such as Yemen; the maritime security in the Gulf in
the context of Iranian assertiveness on the sea; and the
ballistic arms race led by the same Iran. Following this
appraisal of the contemporary security environment,
we look at some of the most significant projects within
the GCC to enhance its military cooperation: the building of a joint command; the emphasis on joint naval
activities; and the making of a regional missile defense
coordination structure. We also identify some of the
long-term needs for the national armed forces to fulfil
these objectives: the need to strengthen education and
training programs in the Peninsula and to foster a
multilateral culture among Gulf militaries. Finally, the
fourth part of the monograph considers the relations
with Western allies in that perspective. In particular,
we argue how initiatives such as the U.S.-Gulf Strategic Forum and NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
could prove instrumental to support GCC’s collective
defense project.
DEFINING THE GULF SECURITY SYSTEM
To discuss the topic of military cooperation in the
Gulf, we first need to characterize its regional security system. The literature on the subject is abundant.
Back in 1998, Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq
5

Abdulla argued that the Gulf constituted a coherent
regional system (nizaam iqlimi).6 This view has been
challenged by other scholars, such as Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause III, who argued that a system
implied regulating processes and a form of cohesion
that do not yet exist in the Gulf. They pointed out the
various territorial disputes, the power plays, and the
ideological differences as obstacles to the emergence
of such security system. For these researchers, the Gulf
should rather be described as a “security complex,” in
the sense given to this expression by British scholar
Barry Buzan:
a security complex is a set of units whose major processes of
securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked
that their security problems cannot be reasonably
analysed or resolved apart from one another. The central
idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation
and desecuritisation processes in the international system
will manifest themselves in regional clusters.7

In the view of Gause and Barnett, there is no institutionalized regional security system with identifiable
political mechanisms to mitigate a potential crisis, but
all the stakeholders share an understanding of threats,
challenges, and alliance distribution. More precisely,
the Gulf security complex would center on the Saudi-Iranian strategic competition, which defines all subsequent policy options. In many ways, the “Iranian
threat” is driving the security policies of the kingdoms
of the GCC, so that it can be characterized as a matrix
through which all the troubles in the Gulf (discontent
in Bahrain and insurgency in Yemen) are analyzed and
framed.8 Although this idea is revealing, it downplays
the distinct policy conducted at least by one of the GCC
members, Oman, which has traditionally maintained
closer diplomatic relations with Iran.9 Still, think tanks
6

and media outlets frequently refer to this competition
as a new cold war according to which the “two main
actors are not confronting each other militarily; rather,
their contest for influence plays out in the domestic
political systems of the region’s weak states.”10 This
metaphor led observers to portray the GCC as the new
NATO of this cold war.
However, we believe that the values of a NATO
analogy have less to do with the geopolitics than with
the lessons regarding regional integration in the military field. Labeling the GCC as a Gulf NATO would
run the risk of dismissing its existing structure and
its development over the last 3 decades. This is why
to understand the values and limitations of a NATO
analogy in the Gulf, one needs to look carefully at the
existing regional architecture, in particular the history
of the GCC.
On May 25, 1981, six Arab states (Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates) gathered in Abu Dhabi to build the GCC. The
GCC was born in a time of war in the region: in September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched an attack on
Iran that would lead to a bloody 8-year war. Iran had
only ended its revolution against the Shah to put into
place a new Islamic regime with a messianic agenda. In
the Levant, the Lebanese civil war was escalating with
the unravelling of the remnants of Lebanon’s state and
the strengthening of sectarian militias―of which Iran
would soon create and support its own, the Hezbollah.
As the pan-Arab ideology declined, Islamist extremist organizations also were becoming a major threat to
Arab states, a phenomenon Saudi Arabia witnessed
with the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979.11
The original agreement for the GCC did not mention these regional developments but underlined
the “special relations, common characteristics, and
7

similar regimes” of its members, adding the “belief
in a common destiny and unity of objectives.”12 Subsequently, three main bodies were established. The
Supreme Council gathers the heads of state of member
countries with its presidency held on a rotational basis.
It meets twice a year for normal sessions. The Ministerial Council composed of the foreign ministers prepares the meetings for the Supreme Council and meets
every 2 months. Finally, the permanent structure of the
GCC is its Secretariat General, with its headquarters in
Riyadh.
Although the 1981 Charter mentioned various fields
covered by GCC regulations (e.g., economic affairs,
customs, education, and tourism), defense was not
included. Interestingly, the 1981 Charter did not delve
into the details of security cooperation. Compared to
the NATO Treaty, the GCC Charter describes much
more the functioning of the organization but tells us
nothing about the strategic environment, except a brief
mention to the Arab League. For instance, there is no
article that would be similar to the famous Article 5 of
NATO that epitomizes collective defense.13
However, the international security environment
was discussed explicitly by Gulf leaders in their declarations during the founding summit in the United
Arab Emirates capital. In addition to their refusal of
any foreign interference in the region, the heads of state
expressed their desire to end the Iran-Iraq war, although
they refrained from suggesting any end-state desired.14
Apart from these statements, the message conveyed in
1981 was that the creation of the GCC was more about
building a common economic area than about establishing a military alliance. In that perspective, it shared
more with the European Union project that looked
at security only as a means to ensure prosperity than
with NATO that was perceived as the primary agent
8

of collective defense for the North-American European
zone. For instance, a project for a monetary union to
create a single currency was launched, although it is
still struggling today with political sensitivities. All of
these go against the idea of simply making the GCC a
military alliance comparable to NATO.
Security and defense affairs progressively, though
cautiously, appeared on the agenda of GCC summits.
For instance, in 1987, the Riyadh Summit approved a
common “comprehensive security strategy”15 but it
was an initiative led by Interior Ministers.16 The 1987
Summit also endorsed the recommendations by GCC
defense ministers on military cooperation. At that
time, one of the most significant items on the agenda
was Egyptian contribution to GCC military development. There were exchanges regarding an Egyptian
involvement in the building of a joint Gulf arms industry, and Cairo also offered to deploy 15,000 troops to a
joint Arab force to protect Gulf States in the context of
the Iran-Iraq war.17
Heavily influenced by the Gulf war, in 1991, the
annual summit increased the military rapprochement
through joint military exercises and the creation of a
GCC force―soon to be named the Peninsula Shield.18
Integration of national air defenses was discussed for
the first time at the Riyadh Summit in 1993. Again, a
new step was reached in 2000 with the joint defense
agreement signed at the Manama Summit.19
Over the years, many specialized committees
within the structure of the GCC dealt with security
matters: strategic planning, counterterrorism cooperation, drug control, civil defense, and cooperation
against nuclear and radioactive risks. As for any international organization, the inflation of new bureaucratic
units meant more demands for interagency exchange
and coordination.
9

Although these efforts were mostly limited and
could not be used to depict the GCC as a military alliance, this view gained traction among pundits in the
West that frequently portrayed the Council as a strategic united bloc against Iran and Iraq. For instance,
Harvard professor Stephen Walt portrayed the GCC
as an organization “intended to limit potential pressure from both Iran and the Soviet Union.”20 Walt’s
depiction is at odds with the reality of the GCC as a
very modest military organization.21 King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia famously declared at the GCC summit of
2001:
We are not ashamed to say that we have not been able
to achieve the objectives we sought when we set up the
Gulf Cooperation Council 20 years ago . . . We have not
yet set up a unified military force that deters enemies and
supports friends.22

The statement from King Abdullah emphasized
the long difficulties GCC countries faced in order to
come together regarding to the objective of collective
defense. From the outset, there was a strategic dimension to the GCC project, but several factors concurred
to restrain it: the numerous wars in the region, the reliance on the United States as an external provider of
security to the region, and national differences over
the type of multilateral framework under which the
Council should operate. Finally, as in Europe and elsewhere, Gulf leaders feared for the loss of their own
sovereignty that a stronger GCC would bring.
Furthermore, the unequal level of readiness and
interoperability of GCC forces is acknowledged by
political leaders as well as by military representatives
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from the region, but it has to be considered in a longterm perspective. For the most part, the contemporary
forces of Gulf countries were built after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Gulf War led to two main
trends: a reinforcement of bilateral military cooperation with Western allies (the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France) and a pause regarding collective
regional initiatives. It is worth remembering that back
in the 1990s, GCC members still argued over territorial
disputes: in 1992, tensions at the border between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar led to the death of a Saudi sheikh
and two Qatari soldiers. Qatar was also involved in
a dispute with Bahrain regarding the sovereignty of
the Hawar Islands, and in 1993, Oman expressed its
disagreement over the Saudi-United Arab Emirates
border agreement, arguing that it was covering parts
of the Omani territory.
These two trends―reinforcing ties with Western
allies and building modern national forces―barely left
room for a regional framework. Over time, this generated a fair amount of skepticism among those who
monitored Gulf security developments and witnessed
repeated attempts to reenergize the GCC collective
defense component.23 Therefore, caution and realism
should prevail regarding the feasibility of a “Gulf
NATO.” This does not mean dismissing the current
momentum, but looking at it through its historical
perspective and identifying the real novelty with the
ongoing developments.
THE EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN
THE GULF
In theory, collective defense is an arrangement
committing the members to protect each other. It
posits that the security of one is the concern of all, and
11

therefore, the community seeks a collective response
to the threats. This implies that countries consider
these threats or challenges are commonly perceived
and faced by the other members. In that context, we
present three major challenges that affect the GCC as
a whole. First, we look at the internal instability affecting neighboring countries (in particular Yemen), and
how this led the GCC states to bolster their military
power to either contain or resolve the crises. Additionally, the steady build-up of Iranian naval capabilities,
combined with the assertiveness of the Revolutionary Guard, create a dangerous maritime environment
in the Gulf. Finally, the missile arsenal assembled by
Tehran puts the major urban centers of the GCC under
the threat of a ballistic attack.
The Demands of Regional Interventions
Although a few years ago Gulf armed forces were
described as mere symbols of national power rather
than as active and ready militaries, regional interventions over the last years dramatically changed this
assumption. In spring 2011, Qatari and Emirati forces
joined NATO in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in
Libya to protect civilians from attacks by the Gadhafi
regime.24 Meanwhile, starting in 2014, air forces from
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
conducted strikes in Syria and Iraq as part of the U.S.led coalition to counter the Islamic State, although
this contribution has been statistically modest.25 The
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait also have
allowed coalition members (the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Italy) to
deploy their air assets on their military bases to launch
strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
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The frequency and the format of these Gulf interventions were a major change compared to the previous deployments.26 It evidenced a new sense of
common security interests and willingness to conduct
joint operations. Then, in March 2015, a new step was
reached when Saudi Arabia decided to build an international coalition to restore the rule of Yemeni President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi after his government
had been overthrown by a competing alliance comprised of the Houthi insurgents and loyalists of former
president Saleh. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen―
although not a GCC intervention per se―was the first
of its type regarding its mandate and the means assembled to conduct the operations.
Although the war started mostly as an air campaign, its scale increased dramatically to include
ground forces. In southern Yemen, a complex amphibious operation was necessary to retake cities such as
Aden. By the end of 2015, the three biggest contributors to the intervention were Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates. Although the operation was
commanded by the Saudi leadership, the United Arab
Emirates provided roughly two-thirds of the personnel (4,000) including 1 brigade, special forces units,
and 2 to 3 armored battlegroups. Apart from Saudi
and Emirati capabilities, the equipment of the coalition remained rather limited, and the participation of a
country like Kuwait has been mostly political.27
The lessons from these recent developments are
several fold. First, the Yemen crisis demonstrated that
GCC countries progressively acquired the ability to
intervene on their own in regional crisis. The political decision was taken quickly and the build-up of the
coalition likewise.28 This constitutes a positive step that
also demands them to sustain such capacity.
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In the current security environment, GCC armed
forces are more likely to be engaged in local low-intensity conflicts occurring in their direct vicinity than
in a major regional war. As of today, the biggest risk
for the stability of the Peninsula comes from the security vacuum in its neighboring countries, in particular
Yemen and Iraq. In both cases, the collapse of state
authority engendered internal strife and opened a
window to private actors such as militias and terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic
State benefited from this void to plan operations in
and from these countries. Moreover, the weakness of
central governments also enabled Iran to meddle into
domestic politics, supporting at different levels its local
partners (the Houthis in Yemen and the Iraqi governments of Nouri al-Maliki and Haidar al-Abadi).
GCC countries logically are concerned about the
potential spillover effects of these crises. For instance,
in Kuwait, policymakers still have vivid memories of
Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1990 and explicitly rank
Iraq as their top security priority.29 Usually now forgotten in the United States, the 1990 invasion remains
the central driver of Kuwaiti security strategy for the
current generation of decision makers in the policy
and military spheres.
However, given the geography of the area, Saudi
Arabia is the most concerned. The kingdom constitutes
roughly 80 percent of the Peninsula and shares borders with seven countries. Not only does the kingdom
eye the crisis in Iraq and Yemen, but also it carefully
observes the tremendous pressures the Syrian war has
put on its Jordanian ally. Given its coastline on the Red
Sea, Riyadh has also a critical interest to the stability in
Egypt and Sudan. This explains the strong support it
provided to the regime of Marshall Al Sisi since 2013,
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injecting at least $12 billion into the Egyptian government according to The New York Times.30
In the case of the other GCC members, their small
size and population generally make them vulnerable
to regional shocks. As a result, the GCC leaders have
today the choice between two approaches: containment and crisis management. Both options call for significant resources in terms of military personnel and
financial means. For instance, it is acknowledged by
Gulf decision makers that the eventual resolution to the
war in Yemen will demand some form of nation-building: training the Yemeni military, restoring the central
authority of government, and securing the borders
against illicit trafficking.31
This new regional agenda implies for the GCC to
build and sustain armed forces that would not only
be required to secure their own territory, but be able
to deploy in distant theaters. It is a challenge European forces faced after the end of the Cold War, when
most of them had to shift from a focus on territorial
defense to expeditionary missions.32 It requires critical
capabilities to project power far away. Moreover, the
GCC as a whole will have to discuss and select the scenarios driving its force structure: should its militaries
be able to engage into one or two simultaneous small
conflicts? Should they keep resources for a third contingency? These are delicate choices that can only be
decided through a multilateral process.
The Issue of Maritime Security
Maritime security has always been a major concern in the Gulf. Back in the era of the British Empire,
London allied with the leaders of the Trucial States
to ensure stability in the area so as not to disrupt its
sea-lane to the British Raj. In the 20th century, the Gulf
became one of the most critical sea passages for world
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economy, first with the pearl trade and then with the
oil revolution, in the following decades. Today, a good
share of the international crude oil and liquefied fuels
movements depend on transport through two chokepoints in the area: Bab el Mandab, located between
Somalia and Yemen; and the Strait of Hormuz, between
Oman and Iran.
In the confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz, the
probability of incidents is high, taking into account the
number of vessels that go through it.33 In recent years,
Iran has shown increased boldness in the area. For
instance, in January 2008, Iranian boats approached
three U.S. Navy ships in the Strait, threatening to
explode the American vessels. The U.S. forces were
on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats when those
boats eventually moved away. At that time, a Pentagon official said, “It is the most serious provocation of
this sort that we’ve seen yet, the Iranian boats turned
away literally at the very moment that U.S. forces were
preparing to open fire.”34 The Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) subsequently denied the U.S. version of the events, claiming that the Iranian boats were
conducting “an ordinary identification.”35
The number of such incidents only increased in
recent years. In December 2015, Iran fired a rocket near
the U.S. aircraft carrier, USS Harry Truman. A month
later, the IRGC captured 10 American sailors when
their boats accidentally approached the waters near
Farsi Island. In July 2016, Iran’s ships moved close to
the USS New Orleans while the Commander of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, was aboard.
All these cases show the assertiveness of Iran in the
maritime domain and the risk of miscalculation that
emerges from the repetition of these skirmishes.
In terms of capabilities, the Iranian Navy remains
poorly equipped, most of its ships were purchased
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during the Shah’s era in the 1970s.36 Confrontation
between the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Navy, as well
as the Pasdarans’ own navy, is certainly conceivable,
and that possibility should not be dismissed in terms
of contingencies.37 As Tim Ripley argued, a naval confrontation between Iran and the United States would
likely take the form of “a protracted conflict involving
harassing attacks against U.S. forces and international
maritime trade.”38
Closing the Strait would deny the global economy
of approximately 25 percent of oil supplies, causing
a major disruption of the markets. This is the reason
why a country like the United Arab Emirates opened
a new pipeline that runs from Habshan to the port of
Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman to avoid shipping its barrels of crude oil through the Strait.
Generally, experts have been cautious about the
prospects of escalation in the area and repeatedly
pointed out that Iranian forces had not the ability to
enforce such closure for more than a few days.39 Scenarios based on the frequent threat from Tehran to
close the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to occur.40 In
an article for International Security, Caitlin Talmadge
raised an important issue:
The question is whether Iran can harass shipping enough
to prompt U.S. intervention in defense of the sea-lanes.
Given that the United States has staked its credibility on
promises to do just that, this is a threshold that Iran’s
significant and growing littoral warfare capabilities can
cross, even with fairly conservative assumptions about
Iranian capabilities.41

Talmadge’s analysis provides a detailed account of
the U.S.-Iranian standoff in the Gulf, but it does not
really look at the capabilities of local actors, and in particular, how this could develop in the case of a confrontation, excluding―at least in the first phase―U.S.
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forces. If the Iranian conventional forces do not constitute a strong competitor to the forces of GCC navies, in
particular Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,
then the IRGC has designed an asymmetrical strategy whose maritime component is rather significant.
The naval forces of the IRGC include more than 6,000
mines, 65 missile-armed combat warships, as well as
anti-ship missiles, Kilo class submarines, and midget
submarines that are superior to the capabilities of the
GCC.42 Altogether, these capabilities support an Iranian strategy that does not aim to conquer territories
but to deter and, if needed, deny the access to its areas
of influence.
In light of this Iranian anti-access strategy, it is worth
remembering that, for the last 4 decades, Iran and the
United Arab Emirates have been engaged in a major
territorial dispute over the three islands taken over by
the Shah in 1971: Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser
Tunbs. In spite of previous international commitments,
the Shah had justified the occupation by claiming they
belonged to Iran from ancient times until the early 20th
century. They repeatedly called for the United Nations
(UN) to reach a diplomatic settlement, but these efforts
have all stumbled. Moreover, the Iranian regime not
only ignored the Emirati demands, but also proceeded
to use the islands for military purposes, organizing
military exercises, and storing arsenals. In Abu Musa,
the IRGC built an airport and upgraded the port facilities. In addition to its troops, it deployed anti-aircraft
and anti-ship missiles. This Iranian footprint on the
three islands is supported by the numerous bases built
on its shores, in particular Bandar Abbas and Bandar
Lengeh. In 2011-2012, as tensions rose in the GCC-Iran
relations, President Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa,
and several officials conveyed the message that Iranian forces were ready to use force to defend its hold
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on these islands. This triggered a collective statement
from the GCC supporting the United Arab Emirates in
its claim over the territories. Because there is no end in
sight for this dispute over the three islands, and as Iran
gets more assertive in the maritime domain through
its anti-access strategy, GCC armed forces will have to
include in their planning processes the risk of miscalculation and small naval clashes that could escalate by
accident.
The Ballistic Threat
Since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in
1979, Iran has been developing an indigenous missile
production capability that supports its naval strategy
of anti-access. For instance, the country is reported to
have launched more than 600 ballistic missiles during
its war with Iraq in the 1980s.43 Originally, the purpose
of its program was not Iranian ambitions vis-à-vis
the GCC, but its concerns regarding the Iraqi arsenal.
Throughout the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s regime had
become the first ballistic power in the region. In July
1990, the CIA wrote in a memo, “Iraq has the most
aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development
program in the Arab World.”44 Between February 29
and April 20, 1988, Iraq launched 190 Al Hussein missiles on Iranian cities. Overall, Iraqi missiles killed
more than 2,000 Iranians and injured 6,000.45 The Iraqi
ballistic strategy even made the difference and forced
the Ayatollah Khomeini to concede the end of the war.
In other words, Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles,
striking Tehran as new means to compel surrender.
Revealingly, in 1984, the Iraqi leader was explaining to
his Air Force officers:
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Sometimes what you get out of a weapon is when you
keep saying, ‘I will bomb you’ [and] it is actually better
than bombing him. It is possible that when you bomb him
the material effect will be 40 percent, but if you stick it up
to his face the material and the spiritual effect will be 60
percent, so why hit him? Keep getting 60 percent!46

The following decade saw a major shift in the
regional ballistic arms race. With the international
embargo ensuing from the Gulf War, the Iraqi arsenal
declined and allowed Iran to become the rising challenger in that field. The Iranians benefited from the
same proliferation network as the Iraqis had: North
Korea, China, and Russia. Generally, opacity surrounds the state of Iran’s current arsenal. It is said to
include hundreds of short-range missiles such as the
Shahab-1 and Shahab-2.47 There is contradicting information regarding another short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM), the Quiam, which allegedly was only tested
once in August 2010. Sources assess “the Quiam to
be based on the Shahab-2, with a range between 500
and 1,000 kilometers (km).”48 The Fateh-110 is another
SRBM whose development started in the mid-1990s.
Although Iranians claimed its range to go up to 300
km, independent experts argue that it is likely nearer
200-250 km.49 Iranian MRBM include the Ghadr1, a variant of the Shahab-3. The Sejil, a solid-fueled
ground-mobile ballistic missile, was tested successfully in November 2008. Able to reach a target up to
2,200 km, the Sejil has a payload capacity that could
accommodate a nuclear warhead. Iran has also developed numerous rockets such as the Fajr, the Zelzal,
and the Fateh-110.50 Finally, starting in the late 1990s,
the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Iran was
on the path to acquiring intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 2015.51 Yet, this date was cautiously
revised in recent years by U.S. analysts as the progress
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of the program depends on a certain level of foreign
assistance, in particular from North Korea.
In terms of strategy, the Iranians appeared to learn
the lesson from the so-called “war of the cities,” that
missiles can be effective means of coercion. As the
search for parity at the conventional level between Iran
and the two major GCC armed forces―Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates―became unsustainable for Tehran, its leadership invested its resources
in asymmetric capabilities. In that perspective, the Iranian ballistic arsenal allows it to circumvent the deficiencies of its air force. It also supports its maritime
strategy of occasional harassment and access-denial.52
Like the risk of naval escalation, the prospect of Iran
launching missiles, loading them on its ships close to
the maritime space of GCC countries, or displaying
them on the United Arab Emirates occupied islands
is of concern for the whole region. A scenario of Iran
ostentatiously stationing long-range missiles on Abu
Musa is a daunting one that could turn into a kind of
“local Cuban missile crisis,” with the United States
being forced to intervene to prevent escalation, while
reassuring its Arab partners. As we explain in the next
section, one of the solutions to address this threat can
be found in the increased regional cooperation in the
field of missile defense.
All in all, these three major challenges―security
vacuums, maritime instability, and missile proliferation―are likely to grow in coming years, and they will
affect the security interests of the GCC as a whole. In
the next section, we look at how the on-going strengthening of collective defense in the Peninsula through
specific projects could address these threats.
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THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A
GULF NATO
In the following pages, we analyze four recent and
critical projects that could both address the previous
threats identified and enhance the regional security
architecture in the Peninsula: the making of a GCC
united military command; the creation of a common
naval group; the establishment of a missile defense
coordination cell; and the establishment of a GCC
defense college.
The Significance of a Robust United Military
Command
The project of a Gulf joint military command has
probably been the most discussed project regarding
cooperation in the region. Although its existence is not
yet mature, the project itself surfaced almost 2 decades
ago. The first step toward a collective approach was
reached in Manama, Bahrain, in December 2000 during
a GCC summit where the Gulf Security Agreement
was signed. The document indicated the willingness
of the GCC to go from consultation and cooperation
on defense to a genuine collective defense posture. It
strengthened the central function of the GCC Defense
Council’s High Military Committee and the coordinating role of the Adjunct Secretary General for Military
Affairs. The agreement paved the way to the recent
reinforcement of the Peninsula Shield in limited-scale
crisis.53
Still, the idea of a united military command was
expressed officially at the 33rd GCC summit in December 2012. The rationale for such a structure was to centralize the efforts of the GCC in military affairs. By
that time, numerous committees were dealing with
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different files: military training, procurement, technology, and the Peninsula Shield. This had generated
overlapping and loose supervision; therefore, a united
military command was seen as the logical step to reinforce the military cohesion of the GCC.54 Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa
clarified the ambitions:
We want to create a central command that coordinates
between all sub-commands and makes them work under
one umbrella. But, the new structure [the Unified Military
Command] won’t replace the Peninsula Shield forces.55

A year later, the project again was mentioned in the
official documents of the 34th Summit held in Kuwait
City, although only a few details were conveyed to the
media. The new command would gather about 100,000
men, half of whom were sent by Saudi Arabia.56 It
would oversee air, land, and maritime forces of the
GCC militaries.
Based on the information available, this GCC united
military command might look similar to NATO’s
Allied Command for Operations (ACO) located in the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Mons, Belgium. ACO is responsible for the planning and execution of NATO military operations and operates at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although
its permanent structure was much bigger during the
Cold War, the new format approved by NATO defense
ministers in June 2011 is getting leaner. Noticeably,
both the ACO and the Gulf projects acknowledge the
prevailing role of the biggest defense contributors to
the alliances: respectively the United States and Saudi
Arabia. In the same way that the position of Supreme
Allied Commander Europe traditionally is held by a
U.S. flag officer, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the
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united command. Not only does the country host the
command, but also it provides by far the biggest share
of its resources. Even though there has not been any
official nomination yet, it is very likely that the commander would be a Saudi military representative.
Some of the major obstacles NATO structures faced
would not be relevant in the Gulf context. For instance,
within the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance,
standardization has always been a challenge. NATO
countries for a long time have organized their own
procurement policies, their own force generation processes, and their own doctrines. There is not exactly
one NATO military culture, but rather the aggregation of 28 different ones. This meant for the ACO that
commanding an operation involving a dozen of different armed forces was a daunting task. Standardization within NATO has never been an easy endeavor
because it challenges national prerogatives. Moreover,
the fact that NATO standardization practically implies
American standardization led some European countries eager to protect their national defense industries
and their doctrinal traditions to impede such process.
Another problem of NATO allied commands
relates to the language constraints. It could sound a
mundane issue, but for many European allies, finding mid to high-ranking officers able to operate and
to hold critical command responsibilities in English is
not an easy task. This linguistic factor certainly played
a role to hinder the building of the NATO command
structure.
Within the GCC, these issues would not represent
the same problems. First, the language constraint does
not exist, as all members share Arabic. Second, the standardization process is likely to be less difficult. Most
of the military platforms of GCC members are bought

24

from the United States and the United Kingdom or
France and, therefore, could operate under similar processes. This also means that doctrines and military cultures could adapt more easily. Additionally, although
there is a growing indigenous defense industry (in the
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), it would not
be affected by a standardization process the way European military companies (Airbus and Finmeccanica,
among others) are within NATO.
The Importance of Maritime Coordination
As the Kuwait City Summit of 2013 reaffirmed the
creation of a united command, it also announced the
foundation of a coordination center for maritime security, to be hosted by Bahrain. As mentioned earlier, the
threats and challenges GCC countries face in the waters
of the Gulf are demanding a collective response.
The choice of Bahrain is a sound one in terms of
geography but also in terms of international cooperation. The kingdom already hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet
that is responsible for naval forces in the Gulf, the Red
Sea, the Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean.
Given its size and its missions, the Fifth Fleet is a major
hub not only for U.S. operations, but also for multilateral operations and exercises in the area. Moreover,
the Royal Navy also is building its own naval base in
Manama that will cover all British maritime activities
in the area, a major move from London that reinforces
the position of Bahrain as the hub for maritime cooperation both within the GCC and with Western allies.
Beyond the coordination center, in order to build
a sustainable regional naval force, the GCC will need
to address the same challenges NATO has been struggling with, that is, to allocate sufficient capabilities to
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the national navies. There has sometimes been a gap
between NATO initiatives and the resources that its
members are able or willing to offer. Gulf navies are
still nascent forces whose ability to project power is
limited. Only the United Arab Emirates naval forces
so far have been able to conduct complex operations as
evidenced by their long deployment in Yemen, including amphibious landing in several cities in the south of
the country between 2015 and 2016. Emirati maritime
maneuvers in Yemen left American counterparts “surprised and impressed.”57 The operation indicated a
level of effectiveness that equaled one of the European
navies, but (except for Saudi Arabia) this is not yet the
case of the other Gulf navies.58 For the other countries
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman), naval means are
more limited, logically proportional to the small size of
their overall militaries.
This imbalance between Gulf navies is not the central issue. The challenge for a collective naval force
would be to identify the sufficient level of forces it
needs to integrate in order to deter any aggression or,
if a crisis erupts, to deploy means swiftly. This would
also require defining an acceptable division of labor
among Gulf navies.
Eventually, the solution to this equation depends
on the scenarios of engagement selected by GCC leaders. Would a future naval coordination center monitor
only low-intensity activities such as patrolling the sea
against piracy, or would it progressively go as far as
to become the maritime body in charge of any major
crisis in the Gulf? A major question that is worth asking
through that process is the place conferred to cooperation with Western allies: should local navies build their
force structure, assuming allies would not intervene or
would have left the area? This is the kind of security
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dilemma Europeans have faced vis-à-vis the Americans for a long time. Frequently accused of free-riding,
European governments have decreased their defense
expenditures steadily as they faced a financial crisis
since 2008. The fact that U.S. military commitment
remained stable did not provide any incentive for
Europeans to invest in their own forces. GCC leaders
could face the very same dilemma. On one hand, planning with a U.S. naval presence is not likely to encourage countries with lesser means to invest more. On the
other, planning without a U.S. naval presence assumes
the Americans would not fulfil their commitment to
its partners, something that remains in both cases―in
Europe and in the Gulf―highly hypothetical (and contradicting current policies).
One way or another, the building of a strong
GCC naval component will take time. It is a matter of
decades, not just a few years. In all regions, procuring
ships and deploying platforms with trained sailors are
long endeavors.
A Regional Missile Defense Coordinating Cell
Given the pace and scale of Iran’s ballistic arsenal,
it is no surprise that GCC countries have been eager
to procure U.S. missile defense systems. As of today,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia
have been at the forefront of these purchases. In 2013,
Abu Dhabi bought Patriot missile batteries as well as
two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
batteries. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia procured the biggest and the oldest missile defense capability. As a
matter of fact, Riyadh started investing into this field
following the Gulf War of 1990. The use of SRBMs and
cruise missiles by Saddam Hussein against the country
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was an obvious wake-up call for its leadership. Today,
according to independent surveys, the Saudi kingdom
has acquired and deployed various systems: Hawk
surface-to-air missiles (MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K
Hawk) and Patriot batteries, which include Pac-2 and
Pac-3. As they were getting old, the Pac-3 batteries are
currently going through a process of upgrading.59 In
recent years, there have been speculations that Saudi
Arabia would go further into deploying its missile
defense capabilities by purchasing Aegis destroyers
and the THAAD system that the United Arab Emirates
already bought.60 In early 2015, a high-level representative from Lockheed Martin went public to announce
that Saudi Arabia was going to order the THAAD
system, but until today, this was not confirmed by an
official statement from Riyadh.61
Regarding Qatar, the leadership in Doha also
decided to acquire 10 Patriot batteries, which were
part of a broader arms sale deal with the United States
worth $11 billion.62 Finally, in June 2016, Raytheon
announced that it would modernize Kuwait’s Patriot
systems under a $523 million contract issued by the
U.S. Army.63
While these sales evidence the strong interest from
Gulf kingdoms to strengthen their defenses against
Iranian ballistic means, they were national initiatives
taken without consulting neighboring allies. For several years now, the U.S. Government strongly supported the idea of building a genuine GCC missile
defense system that would ensure comprehensive coverage of the territories of the organization. Not only
did it make sense at the military level, but also missile
defense was identified as a means to foster the project of collective defense in the Peninsula. In December
2013, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel visited Gulf
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capitals to announce a reinforcement of U.S. missile
defense systems sold to GCC countries, adding that
the Barack Obama administration aimed to do so “by
working in a coordinated way with the GCC.”64
Noticeably, this U.S.-Gulf cooperation developed
while the negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear
program were underway; therefore, missile defense
clearly played a role of reassurance for the Gulf allies.
The file progressively became a pillar of U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue. At the U.S.-Gulf Summit in May 2015,
heads of state publicly committed to build a regional
defense architecture. In early 2016, there were signs that
Gulf States were soon to make a joint missile defense
structure official. During an air force conference, on
January 20, Reuters reported the words of Hamad Al
Khalifah, commander of the Royal Bahraini Air Force,
“we have started and hopefully it (the result) will be
announced soon.”65
Although the specifics of a GCC joint missile
defense architecture obviously are not open to the
public, the challenges country members face are similar to those that have been at the core of NATO internal
discussions―and sometimes disputes. A joint system
implies joint ownership that challenges several aspects
of the decision-making: the investments in capabilities, the sharing of intelligence data, and the chain of
command.
First, a collective missile defense structure would
need to specify the levels of burden sharing among its
members regarding the allocated capabilities. The biggest specificity of the field of missile defense, compared
to other arms domains, relates to the level of sophistication of these systems involving several platforms
and combining numerous technologies. As a result,
missile defense enterprises remain an expensive game.
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Although most of the GCC members have bought
some capabilities, only Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are deploying the most comprehensive
systems. As in Europe, the imbalance between burden
sharing is not inevitably going to block the whole project, but it has to be addressed. As NATO also faced an
imbalance―which to a certain extent was much bigger
between the United States and Europe than the one in
the Gulf―the U.S. administration offered (to its European allies) to allocate its capabilities such as radars,
interceptors, and Aegis destroyers, while the rest of the
Atlantic Alliance would focus on the command and
control system. The GCC solution likely is to be different, but the challenge is a similar one as it relates to
the ability of allies to build a common system despite
disparities regarding their own capabilities.
The second and third issues directly touch upon
matters of national sovereignty. Intelligence sharing
and political decision-making remain sensitive processes that in the case of a GCC missile defense would
require a robust organization with clearly established
and automated routines that would exclude long consultations for practical reasons. Inside NATO, there is
a fear from some European members that, because the
United States owns most of the capabilities and technologies, it would be the primary, if not the unique,
decision maker. In the Gulf, if one imagines a scenario
where Iran was to launch a missile on Saudi Arabia and
radars in the United Arab Emirates and/or Qatar were
to detect the launching, sharing the data with Saudi
counterparts would have to be done in a few minutes,
if not seconds. Likewise, if the GCC as a whole was
to decide to retaliate by intercepting the missile, it
could not do so by convening a meeting of heads of
states but by specifying the chain reaction prior to the
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crisis. It is not an easy task, as evidenced by the difficulties NATO has faced in that same domain for
several years.
Building a Multilateral Culture through Military
Education
Another major challenge that GCC armed forces
face in the build-up of a robust collective defense
system relates to the multilateral culture such organization requires. Earlier we described the operational
requirements to build a united command or coordination units in the field of missile defense and maritime
security, but these new bodies will only become cohesive if the troops of the Gulf kingdoms become accustomed to the culture of multilateral work. In other
words, technical interoperability also relies on cultural
interoperability. This alliance culture is what generates bonds and a feeling of camaraderie among officers
from different countries. It shapes the exchanges and
allows for disagreements in order to reach a consensus
on core issues.
It is not an easy and short process. The warfighting experience is an important driver of that culture.
Regional interventions such as the one in Yemen are a
first step toward this objective. Because of its scale and
duration, an operation like the one of 2015-2016 forces
officers to familiarize themselves with the distinct military cultures of allies and to increase their awareness
on the subtleties of allied operations.
However, the warfighting experience is not the
only instrument to shape a multilateral culture among
armed forces: military education and training programs are equally important. The NATO experience
provides an interesting lesson in that domain. The
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builders of the Atlantic Alliance understood from the
outset that building such a multilateral culture would
be necessary to ensure the cohesion of its military
structure. Creating commands and a headquarters to
gather the military leaders was necessary but not sufficient. This is why as early as 1951, General Dwight
Eisenhower identified military education as an instrument of building a NATO ethos. In a statement to the
North Atlantic Council on April 25, 1951, Eisenhower
declared, “it is highly desirable to establish in the
near future a NATO Defense College for the training of individuals who will be needed to serve in key
capacities in NATO Organizations.”66 This new education entity would not replace national war colleges
that were already training their officers, but it would
bring about the multinational culture that domestic
institutions could not instill. By attending courses at
the NATO Defense College―as well as at the NATO
School created in 1975―officers from allied countries
would meet, share views, disagree on some issues, but
eventually learn to work together. In other words, education was not to be seen as a goal but as a means to
foster the NATO culture.
Interestingly, military education has been the
object of a renewed interest from Gulf leaders. Countries like the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, or
Kuwait recently have created defense colleges whose
objective is to prepare a new generation of officers to
understand the impact of international affairs on their
national security interests. Moreover, the decision in
the 2015 GCC summit to build a GCC Defense College
to be hosted by the United Arab Emirates reinforces
the idea that common education programs could pave
the way for a more cohesive military structure. One
could rightfully argue that this project is nothing new
as GCC chiefs of state had already envisioned a joint
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Gulf Military College as early as February 1984.67 Still,
its ongoing development should be encouraged. From
a practical point of view, initiatives like a GCC Defense
College are much less complex to implement, they
are by nature less politically sensitive than a missile
defense coordination center or a united military command, but over time, they equally play a major role in
the strengthening of the collective defense project.
Implications for U.S. Regional Policy
In recent history, one of the most difficult U.S. challenges has been to find the right balance between reinforcing local initiatives in the Gulf, while reassuring
its partners regarding its long-term commitment to the
stability of the region. This meant pushing for a more
effective regional security architecture without implying the United States was to decrease its engagement
in the region. This policy mix of support to multilateral projects and reassurance measures―made at the
bilateral level―sometimes has seemed contradictory,
but the stability of the Peninsula is likely to depend on
this equation.
The United States aims to enhance its regional
policy not only via bilateral relations, but also at the
multilateral level, in particular following the creation
of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in 2012.
This forum gathers all the political representatives of
the GCC and the U.S. Government to exchange on
major strategic issues such as counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Syrian
civil war. The goal of this new initiative is clearly to
foster the GCC’s own collective dynamic. It also signals the American intention to “multilateralize” its
policy toward the region to avoid the past competitive
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bilateralism.68 As of today, the most important areas
of cooperation under the framework of this U.S.-GCC
Strategic Cooperation Forum have been missile defense
and arms procurement but it may be worth considering expanding this current focus to military education.
The GCC could benefit from U.S. know-how in this
domain, through a closer cooperation with U.S. professional military education institutions.
Furthermore, we believe that an additional way to
solve the equation of U.S.-Gulf relations is to use the
role of NATO in a more efficient way in the region.
Although NATO is a frequently used analogy for the
GCC, the existence of a partnership between the Atlantic Alliance and Gulf countries is sometimes forgotten.
In 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was
launched during the Alliance Summit hosted in the
Turkish city. In the final Summit Declaration, the heads
of state asserted that, in complementing the existing
Mediterranean Dialog, the ICI was:
offered by NATO to interested countries in the region,
starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, to foster mutually beneficial bilateral
relationships and thus enhance security and stability,

by focusing:
on practical cooperation where NATO can add value.69

The ICI was to become the partnership tool for NATO to
engage with the GCC as a whole but Saudi Arabia and
Oman, which account for approximately 70 percent of
the Gulf countries’ defense expenditures, declined to
be part of the ICI. Both agreed to participate in some
activities but refrained from institutionalizing their
relations with NATO.
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Another shortcoming relates to the traditional
inclination toward bilateralism in the Peninsula: the
ICI partners approached NATO’s initiative the same
way they approached their multiple national security
arrangements and guarantees with Western powers.
In both cases, the GCC countries sought close bilateral
relations to pursue their own distinctive diplomatic
goals. Furthermore, ICI partners sometimes are of
two minds about their relations with NATO. Several
officials from GCC countries met in the region and
expressed their “ignorance about NATO’s real objectives with the ICI,” describing it as “a partnership
without a cause.” Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the
Gulf Research Centre, was already underlining this
tendency in 2006:
the initiative being put forward within the framework
of NATO has been perceived in negative terms as being
no more than a mechanism by which the West can
continue to control the region. With the reputation of the
United States in the Gulf deteriorating rapidly, NATO
was perceived as a wolf in sheep’s clothing or as a new
package for Western policies of the past.70

Recognizing these pitfalls is a necessary process
if one wants to improve NATO-Gulf relations. Given
the current momentum for collective defense in the
Peninsula, the NATO partnership more than ever is
an asset to leverage. The Alliance’s experience in the
field of multinational military education and training
could help the GCC build its own. The NATO School
in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defense
College in Rome, Italy, play primary roles to that purpose, but there are many other initiatives opened to
partners such as the Defense Education Enhancement
Program and ad-hoc training teams deployed by the
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Allied Command for Transformation.71 Focusing on
military education and training is a realistic objective,
given the vast disparities among the armed forces of
partner countries in terms of expenditures, force structure, and military readiness. The value of NATO as a
defense education and training provider is evidenced
by the enduring interest of Middle East partners for
the various activities (exercises and courses) offered by
NATO structures.
NATO could also play a significant role in support of
the GCC defense initiatives to share lessons learned in
the establishment of a united command. The ICI could
also be turned into a platform to cover common operational challenges such as maritime security and missile
defense, which are very likely to shape the strategic
agenda of both regional actors. In that perspective, the
United States should consult with its transatlantic allies
to reconsider the format of their partnership toward
the Gulf. Such a new relation would decrease the U.S.
burden and enhance the multilateral framework, while
both reassuring local allies of Western solidarity and
providing them support for their projects in the field
of collective defense. Announced in early 2017, the
building of the first NATO-ICI Regional Centre in the
Emirate of Kuwait could pave the way for this new
step in the development of the Gulf-NATO partnership.
This new entity could grow as a unique forum in the
region to discuss all security issues mentioned earlier
at the multilateral level.72
CONCLUSION
The issue of collective defense in the Gulf has
evolved significantly over the recent years. As
explained, there are numerous indicators that the
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long-awaited regional security architecture for the
Peninsula might emerge in the not so distant future.
Of course, in light of the lessons of past initiatives and
contemporary disputes, one should remain cautious
when looking at these developments. Because of the
evolving security challenges facing the Gulf partners,
there is an urgent need to build a reliable framework to
address these issues.
For the U.S. Government, the stability of the Gulf
remains a major national security interest, and the key
in the ongoing process will be to find a right posture
vis-à-vis the GCC evolution. U.S. forces are unlikely to
leave the area in the near future, but their role could
evolve progressively from a fighting force to a supporting force for Gulf partners. Over the long term,
this implies that the United States also would accept
decreasing its own ability to shape regional dynamics. Although this generates a fair amount of criticisms in Washington, this is already the case regarding
U.S. support to the coalition in Yemen and the sometimes-conflicted views between the United States and
Saudi Arabia on the objectives of the campaign.
This new environment for defense diplomacy in
the Gulf means a more complex environment to grasp.
While the United States should monitor closely the
evolution of GCC military initiatives, it should consult
with NATO and include the Alliance in its Strategic
Cooperation Forum in the region. Through this process, exchanges with the United Kingdom and France,
two close European allies with significant presence in
the Gulf, will also enable the U.S. Government to support the collective defense efforts in the region without sidelining any of the stakeholders. Eventually,
this transition would lead to a new division of labor
between Western and local forces, and therefore, it
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is extremely important for all the parties involved to
ensure the stability of the region all along this process.
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